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Copyright is conventionally understood as serving the dual purposes of pro-
viding incentives for the creation of new works and access to the resulting
works. In most analysis of copyright, however, creation takes priority. When
access is considered, it is often in the context of how access relates back to the
creation of new works. Largely missing is an account of the value of access on
its own terms.
So what is the place of access in copyright law and policy? A set of cases
dealing with copyright owners’ attempts to enjoin the markets created by new
playback and distribution technologies is instructive. These decisions—where
the courts refused to enforce copyright where the owners attempted to shut
down a market rather than participate in it—have been criticized for their un-
clear policy guidance and lack of doctrinal grounding. We can reconcile these
cases with copyright policy by focusing on access. These cases provide rich
examples showing how expanded access advances copyright’s higher-order
goals of promoting a more democratic and participatory culture.
Focusing on access also provides a means for bringing doctrinal coherence
to these cases through the fair-use defense. The courts permitted the use of
copyrighted works in new markets despite the copyright owners’ objections
because these markets could expand public access without diminishing the
copyright industries’ creative incentives. Indeed, copyright owners often found
the markets profitable after being forced to enter them. Copyright owners’
market refusal in these scenarios is a distinct type of market failure, and fair-
use doctrine allows courts to correct it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What is copyright for? The standard answer is that it serves the dual
purposes of providing incentives for the creation of new works as well
as access to the resulting works.1 Within this framework—the “incen-
tives–access paradigm”—scholars have devoted substantial attention
to the problem of finding the right incentives for creation.2 Copyright
must provide enough protection to protect against free-riding or else
too few works will be made; it must not provide too much protection,
however, or it may impose unnecessary obstacles on those who would
build on the works of others, again resulting in suboptimal production
incentives.3
Less has been said about access in its own right or the challenges of
achieving it.4 Typically, access is discussed only as a constraint on ex-
1. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copy-
right law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. . . . It is said that
reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of
his creative genius.”).
2. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives–Access Paradigm,
49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485–86 (1996).
3. Id. at 485–87.
4. Notable exceptions include Jessica Litman’s work recounting the importance
of works actually reaching the public if copyright is to achieve any public purpose,
Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 325, 339 (2011)
(“[A] moment’s reflection should reveal that a copyright system with no readers, lis-
teners or viewers to enjoy the copyrighted works that the system produces has no
plausible mechanism for promoting the progress of anything.”), and Julie Cohen’s
work documenting how copyright law has become a framework not for providing cre-
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tending copyright further; while we might wish to award greater rights
to incentivize creation, doing so may reduce access by allowing copy-
right owners to raise their prices.5 There is little separate analysis of
whether copyright law needs to incentivize copyright owners to pro-
vide access to their works, or how it could do so.
Once the work is created, the assumption is that access will take
care of itself because the copyright owner will seek to market the
work as widely as possible.6 This assumption has not held up in prac-
tice. From the gramophone to streaming video, innovations in play-
back and distribution technology have given rise to what this Article
refers to as new “access markets,” or markets for engaging with al-
ready-created works in a new medium.7 The copyright industries—
those whose business entails producing and distributing copyrighted
content—have repeatedly refused to enter these markets, even though
it is clear in retrospect that doing so often would have been profitable.
Several of the most high-profile cases in copyright law have accord-
ingly dealt with the copyright industries’ attempts to enjoin the use of
their works in these markets they had no intent to enter.
The courts’ decisions in these cases have drawn criticism for their
murky reasoning.8 One series of opinions—beginning with a dispute
over the player piano,9 and continuing through cable television,10 the
VCR,11 and the MP3 player12—has been particularly controversial. In
each of these cases, the court sided against the copyright owner.
ative incentives per se, but for regulating and achieving coordination among produc-
ers and distributors in the copyright industries, Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property
in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 141, 142–43
(2011) (“[C]opyright is about the proper industrial policy for the so-called creative
industries and other information intermediaries . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUDS. 325, 326 (1989) (“Striking the correct balance
between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”); Lunney,
supra note 2, at 557–58 (“If we increase a work’s protection to increase the chance of
its creation, we necessarily increase the price the author will charge for the work and
thereby restrict access to the work if and when it is created.”).
6. Litman, supra note 4, at 339 (“[W]e tend to take that part of the copyright
ecosystem for granted.”).
7. I use the term “access market” to encompass both distribution markets and
the markets for playback devices like the VCR that allow users to engage with works
in new ways. These markets for already-existing works present issues distinct from
markets for the production of new works (or for the use of existing works as inputs
for new works).
8. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copy-
right Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 143, 147 (2007) (“[T]he manner in which the courts have achieved this equi-
poise was neither direct nor candid, resulting in an undesirable muddling of the
law.”).
9. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
10. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see
also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (present-
ing a more difficult set of facts).
11. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Scholars have criticized the stated grounds for these decisions as
“strained, not to say disingenuous”;13 the courts denied liability even
where the alleged infringement was as overt as the unauthorized re-
cording of the plaintiffs’ music.14 These cases do not seem to be driven
by doctrine but are instead consistent with an implicit policy of deny-
ing copyright protection in scenarios where the plaintiff refuses to
enter the market for itself.15 More recent decisions in favor of copy-
right owners accentuate the point: several courts have skirted the pro-
defendant precedent of these earlier cases as part of a trend of punish-
ing various digital services for competing unfairly with the copyright
industries’ established markets.16
Focusing on access provides a means to resolve the apparent anom-
aly. Critics are skeptical of these cases because they question whether
the cases have anything to do with copyright—while many argue these
were appropriate outcomes, they do so not on the basis of copyright
policy but instead by reference to communications policy, innovation
policy, or competition law.17 This criticism aligns with the prominent
notion among copyright scholars that mere “consumptive uses” of
works—whereby readers, listeners, or viewers enjoy the work—gener-
ate little to no social value.18 But this view ignores how these decisions
have consistently advanced copyright policy—even as it is convention-
ally understood—by increasing both creation incentives and access.
Each of these access markets increased the copyright industries’ prof-
its relative to the status quo, and the standard economic account of
copyright predicts that greater profits translate into greater incentives
12. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
13. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemi-
nation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (2001); see also, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David
Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 993 (2007) [hereinafter Unwinding
Sony] (criticizing the Sony decision for “post hoc rationalization and questionable
interpretation of copyright history and doctrine”); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Commu-
nications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 302 (2004) (arguing that unspoken policy
concerns drove White-Smith’s “doctrinal and rather clumsy rationale”).
14. White-Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 18.
15. Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1383, 1391 (2014) (“Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts do not generally an-
nounce [this] basis, since it both implies second-guessing business decisions and as-
cribes sinister motivations to the refusal to license.”).
16. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 187 (noting that “courts . . . have
contorted their analyses to find liable those whose conduct appears blameworthy”).
17. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 829, 831 (2008) (arguing that the copyright fair-use defense “plays an im-
portant and underappreciated role in U.S. technology and innovation policy”); Wu,
supra note 13, at 279 (exploring copyright’s relation to communications, innovation,
and competition policy).
18. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 15–16 (1997); see also David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringe-
ment, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1809 n.65 (2013) (acknowledging but discounting the
social value of consumptive because it “is almost entirely internalized by users”).
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to create new works; it is also clear to see how the opening of new
markets increases access.19
These scenarios also demonstrate how the expansion of access mar-
kets advances the deeper normative goals of copyright. An increasing
number of IP scholars have called for copyright analysis to move be-
yond the typical, reductionist version of the incentives–access para-
digm.20 One prominent argument is that copyright should promote a
more democratic and participatory culture.21 As with the rest of copy-
right law, the discussion often centers on the production-side concerns
of creators,22 for example through arguments that copyright should be
attentive to the expression of more viewpoints or leave space for users
to speak back to mass culture through the creation of derivative
19. See infra Section III.A. On the profitability of the markets that copyright own-
ers have sought to enjoin, see Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 148 (“Rather than
destroy the film industry—as Jack Valenti infamously predicted—the VCR proved a
great boon to motion picture studios, consumer electronics makers, and consumers
alike.”) (citations omitted); von Lohmann, supra note 17, at 841 (“[W]idespread de-
ployment of portable digital music players appears to be a factor in the popularity of
new digital download services, including most prominently Apple’s iTunes Store,
which now [as of 2007] sells more than five million songs each day . . . .”); and Mark
A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV. 71, 111 (2020)
(“[L]ong experience demonstrates that arguments about the costs of disruptive new
technologies to innovation and creativity are nearly always wrong, or at least
overstated.”).
20. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 14–15 (2012) (criticizing the standard eco-
nomic account); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 325 (2006) (“A cultural
approach . . . would recognize intellectual property’s relationship to autonomy, cul-
ture, democracy, equality, and development, and would shape intellectual property
rights to these ends.”); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get
Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 990 (2012) (high-
lighting the importance of access to copyrighted works for education and
socialization).
21. On the role of copyright in promoting democratic discourse, see Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 363–64
(1996) (“Copyright’s fundamental purpose is to underwrite political competency, with
allocative efficiency a secondary consideration.”). On the role of copyright in facilitat-
ing a more broadly participatory culture, see Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Dem-
ocratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39 (“Power to the people—democracy—in its broadest, thickest
sense, must include our relationship not simply to the state but to culture as a whole,
to the processes of meaning-making that constitute us as individuals.”); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY
114 (2008) (arguing that music remixing should be legal in order to promote cultural
engagement and education); and COHEN, supra note 20, at 103 (“Creativity requires
breathing room and thrives on play in the system of culture. Copyright law should be
judged on how well it advances those goals.”).
22. The Copyright Act formally protects the rights of “authors,” 17 U.S.C. § 201,
but this term applies broadly to include many creators we do not normally think of as
“authors,” such as recording artists and 3D animators. This Article refers to these
parties collectively as “creators” to avoid the limiting connotations of the term
“author.”
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works.23 The expansion of access markets is consistent with this un-
derstanding of copyright’s goals because it generates new revenues
and lowers the costs of distribution, thereby allowing greater diversity
in the production of new works.24 But these markets also contribute to
a more democratic and participatory culture through unique access-
side benefits. Specifically, they expand users’ autonomy through the
introduction of new capabilities for engaging with works and promote
social inclusion by bringing access to previously excluded
communities.25
These policy concerns can be brought to bear on copyright doctrine
through the fair-use defense. The stated grounds of the courts’ prior
decisions concerning new access markets are lacking, but factor four
of the fair-use test provides the means for rehabilitating them. Market
failure has long been recognized as a justification for fair use,26 and
factor four in particular directs the courts to examine the impact of a
given use on the copyright owners’ existing and potential markets.27
These cases share a previously unidentified form of market failure:
market refusal. The copyright owner cannot reasonably claim harm
for lost sales in a market it has refused to enter, so market refusal
would give rise to a presumption of fair use in the absence of demon-
strable harm to its existing markets.28
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes a series of cases
where the copyright industries rejected an access market created by
new technology and then attempted to shut it down, beginning with
prominent cases where the courts permitted the market to move for-
ward. It then considers a set of cases involving similar technologies
23. Litman, supra note 4, at 329 (“Readers’ and listeners’ rights get recast as the
rights of potential authors, inviting the inference that reading and listening don’t
merit a lot of protection for their own sake.”) (internal citation omitted); see, e.g.,
LESSIG, supra note 21, at 114.
24. See infra Section III.B.1.
25. See infra Sections III.B.2–III.B.3.
26. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601
(1982).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
28. While looking to whether the copyright owner intended to enter a market
might seem like an obvious way to assess market harm under factor four, it is not the
conventional approach. For recent scholarship arguing the copyright owner’s treat-
ment of the market should matter under factor four, see Yafit Lev-Aretz, The Subtle
Incentive Theory of Copyright Licensing, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (2015) (argu-
ing in favor of fair use where the plaintiff fails to provide a licensing option), and
Xiyin Tang, Defining the Relevant Market in Fair Use Determinations, at 31–32 (Oct.
10, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3264238 [https://
perma.cc/9T9U-B2BG] (arguing a copyright holder’s “negative actions” toward a
market should give rise to a presumption of fair use). See also Kienitz v. Sconnie
Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding fair use because the copy-
right owner had no plans to license).
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where the courts reached the opposite conclusion. As prior scholar-
ship has observed, these cases reveal a trend where courts denied cop-
yright enforcement in market refusal cases where the plaintiffs could
demonstrate harm to their bottom line. These copyright owners reluc-
tantly entered the new markets after losing in court, and time and
again they found that doing so was more profitable than maintaining
the status quo. Even though the first of these cases was decided in
1908, copyright experts continue to debate whether these decisions
were correct over a century later.
As noted above, one reason commentators have been so ambivalent
in assessing these seemingly results-driven decisions is that no one has
offered a coherent theory for assessing whether these were actually
the right results from the perspective of copyright law. Part III ex-
plores how access markets like those at issue in these cases advance
copyright policy. These markets advanced both the creation and distri-
bution of new works by providing greater pecuniary rewards to cre-
ators and making engagement with these works easier. The nature of
this engagement—providing access for those excluded from the prior
market, or providing greater freedom for the public to decide which
media to consume and their terms for doing so—has also advanced
copyright’s higher-order goal of fostering a more democratic and par-
ticipatory society. Historically, however, the copyright industries have
been slow to embrace these advances; their refusals stem from a com-
bination of systematic risk aversion in the face of new markets, pro-
tectionism for intermediaries in the copyright industries, and
sometimes a desire to suppress or monopolize the technologies that
facilitate these markets. These concerns fall outside the legitimate
scope of copyright protection, and the courts have rightly refused to
endorse them in the cases under discussion.
Part IV shows how these policy concerns can be brought to bear on
doctrine. Scholars have criticized the ad hoc reasoning of the afore-
mentioned cases for decades, suggesting that existing law—correctly
applied—leaves little room for steering copyright owners into new ac-
cess markets. As this Part explains, however, these cases can be recon-
ceived through fair-use doctrine, which allows courts to factor the lack
of market harm to the plaintiff into their decisions. It also explains
what is distinct about market refusal as a type of market failure and
explains why it requires different solutions than the standard transac-
tion-costs market failure.
II. MARKET REFUSAL LITIGATION
Each of the following cases involves a technology that created a
new access market, that is, a market for engaging with or acquiring
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copyrighted works in a new medium.29 The VCR, for example, intro-
duced a potential market for recording programs for later viewing;
MP3 downloading technologies like those used by Napster, and later
iTunes, introduced a new kind of market for downloading music.
The courts’ decisions with respect to these markets may seem too ad
hoc to reconcile or predict as a matter of conventional doctrine.30 The
pattern is clearer, however, if one looks to the economic realities. De-
fendants generally prevailed where the copyright industries refused to
participate in the market, while plaintiffs prevailed where they had
entered the market or made credible plans to so.31 Plaintiffs also won
without entering the market if they could demonstrate harm to their
existing markets.32
A. New-Market Defendant Prevails
Copyright owners have alleged two distinct theories of infringement
in market refusal cases. Direct infringement involves an allegation
that the defendant itself has engaged in conduct prohibited by the
Copyright Act, for example by recording a composer’s song and then
selling the recordings to the public. Even though this might seem like
a straightforward case of infringement, courts have excused it in cer-
tain scenarios where the defendant entered an untapped market. Indi-
rect infringement, by contrast, involves an allegation that the
defendant has provided consumers with the means to commit individ-
ual acts of infringement that collectively harm the copyright owner’s
legitimate markets. Courts have rejected these allegations in scenarios
where the new market was actually complementary, rather than harm-
ful, to the copyright owner’s pre-existing markets.
1. Direct Infringement
The most controversial cases are those where the technology defen-
dant has prevailed despite its direct involvement in copying, distribut-
ing, or broadcasting copyrighted works. To commit any one of these
acts without authorization would ordinarily be infringing; neither the
Copyright Act nor case law explicitly recognizes the plaintiff’s refusal
29. Despite the prominence of the technologies in the discussion that follows, I
focus on the effects of the markets rather than the technologies per se, because
“[w]hat we call the effects of technology are not so much features of things as they are
features of social relations that employ those things.” Jack M. Balkin, The Path of
Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45, 49 (2015). Speaking of markets better cap-
tures the array of legal and social arrangements at issue in most copyright disputes.
30. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1617; Unwinding Sony, supra note 13, at
993; Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 187.
31. Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1617.
32. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(“A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”).
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to enter a market as a defense.33 The Supreme Court has nonetheless
denied liability in two foundational cases where the copyright owner
refused to enter these markets. The cases followed a similar trajec-
tory—in both, the court rejected the copyright holders’ claims on
questionable doctrinal reasoning. In both, the plaintiffs’ industries
subsequently profited after successfully lobbying Congress for a statu-
tory license allowing them to collect royalties in the new market de-
spite their defeat in the courts.
White-Smith Music v. Apollo dealt with the music rolls used in self-
playing pianos, or “pianolas.”34 One could play music on a pianola by
inserting a roll of paper pre-programmed with music via a series of
perforations. Actors in the newly established recording industry had
recorded songs to the rolls without obtaining permission or paying
royalties, and in response copyright owners sued to enjoin the record-
ing of their sheet music.35 The plaintiffs asserted a colorable case of
infringement under the extant Copyright Act by arguing the pianola
roll manufacturers were “publishing,” “copying,” or “vending” their
copyrighted musical compositions.36
The Court nonetheless decided the case in favor of the defendant,
ruling on counterintuitive technical grounds. Justice Day’s majority
opinion held that these music rolls—continuous sheets of paper with
intermittent perforations—were not “copies” for purposes of the Cop-
yright Act because they were not “intelligible” to the human eye.37 In
other words, even a trained musician could not discern the tune by
visually inspecting the roll.38 Requiring a work to be perceptible to the
eye is an odd requirement for a piece of music. As Justice Holmes
noted in concurrence, moreover, this ruling would seem to invite
other parties to commit de facto infringement so long as they conceal
it from the eye through mechanical artifice.39
Commentators have hypothesized that the Court’s decision was
driven not so much by doctrine as by the tacit concern that composers
were behaving opportunistically.40 Pianolas and their accompanying
rolls had achieved widespread use by the time of the decision,41 but
composers were not the ones to pioneer these technologies, and they
had made little effort to enter the burgeoning market.42 Some com-
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
34. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1908).
35. See id. at 9.
36. Rev. Stat. § 4952 (U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907).
37. White-Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 17.
38. Id. at 18. While one could effectively reverse engineer the piece through “great
skill and patience,” the Court dismissed the possibility based on the weight of expert
testimony. Id.
39. Id. at 19–20 (Holmes, J., concurring) (“On principle anything that mechani-
cally reproduces that collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy . . . .”).
40. Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1622; Wu, supra note 13, at 300, 302.
41. White-Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 9.
42. Wu, supra note 13, at 297–98.
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mentators have suggested this suit was the opening move in the music
industry’s larger scheme to assert control not only over recordings of
their music, but also over the playback devices themselves.43 The
Court’s refusal to find infringement thwarted these plans.
After the composers lost in court, the competing interests brokered
a compromise in Congress and established what is now known as the
“mechanical license.”44 Copyright owners prevailed in obtaining the
exclusive right to authorize mechanical reproductions, like the manu-
facture of music rolls.45 The recording industry prevailed, however, in
obtaining a mandatory licensing scheme that forestalled the compos-
ers’ attempt at monopolization.46 Once the copyright owner licensed
the composition to be recorded, any other party was authorized to
make its own recording upon paying a statutory fee.47 Commentators
have observed the statutory fee was set at a rate below what the copy-
right owners would have agreed to in the market,48 which had the ef-
fect of prioritizing the public’s interest in wider distribution over the
copyright owners’ interests in compensation and control.49 Despite
their complaints, the composers profited from this arrangement be-
cause the proliferation of recorded music created a new revenue
stream while also stoking public demand for new music.50
The Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tel-
evision, Inc. on similarly technical but questionable grounds.51 The
municipalities of Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia, lacked
broadcast television service. Until 1957, no local television stations
provided a broadcast signal in their area.52 While two stations had
43. Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1622–23. Congress took up the same concerns in
parallel to the litigation. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (expressing concern
that “some company” might use music copyrights to “monopolize the business of
manufacturing the [sic] selling music-producing machines”); id. at 8 (“Not only would
there be a possibility of a great music trust in this country and abroad, but arrange-
ments are being actively made to bring it about.”). But see Jacob Victor, Reconceptu-
alizing Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72 STAN. L. REV. 915, 940–41 (2020)
(asserting that the monopolization concerns were likely overblown and questioning
whether they were sufficient to explain Congress’s policy choices).




47. See id. at 1076 (establishing that “any other person may make similar use of
the copyrighted work upon the payment” of the statutory fee).
48. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA
CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 226–41 (2010).
49. See Victor, supra note 43, at 918–23.
50. See Wu, supra note 13, at 304 (“[T]oday it is defended both by representatives
of composers and by the music industry.”); see also Peter S. Menell, Adapting Copy-
right for the Mashup Generation, 164 PENN. L. REV. 441, 495 (2016) (observing how
permissive allowances for cover songs has promoted “cumulative creativity [and] ex-
pressive freedom”).
51. See 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
52. Id. at 391.
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emerged by the time Fortnightly was decided in 1968, the local topog-
raphy rendered it impossible for residents to receive more distant sig-
nals with conventional television antennas.53
Fortnightly Corporation solved this problem by operating a commu-
nity antenna television system (“CATV”), i.e., by building a powerful
central antenna that could receive more distant stations and then us-
ing cable to carry the programming to individual subscribers.54 The
networks that owned copyrights in the television programs sued, but
the Court ruled there could be no infringement because cable retrans-
mission was not an actionable “performance” under existing copyright
law.55 The equities of the scenario bolstered the Court’s decision: the
industry was poised to eliminate a distribution system that filled a gen-
uine need, but it offered no solution of its own. Whatever threat cable
might pose in other markets, broadcasters were not harmed if others
brought their programming into markets they had refused to enter.
The Court’s refusal to enforce the broadcasters’ copyrights meant that
these two communities could continue enjoying the same news and
entertainment as the rest of the country. Yet the majority opinion
mentioned none of these factors.56
Dissenting, Justice Fortas questioned the Court’s faithfulness to
doctrine and accused the majority of ignoring precedent—that re-
transmission of a radio broadcast constitutes a performance57—in or-
der to protect the nascent CATV industry.58 While the majority
claimed to ground its opinion in the technical definition of “perform-
ance,” the dissent suggested that what actually motivated the majority
was a policy argument: “[I]t is darkly predicted that the imposition of
full liability upon all CATV operations could result in the demise of
this new, important instrument of mass communications; or in its be-
coming a tool of the powerful networks.”59
Fortnightly also illustrates the problems that follow from articulat-
ing a holding in doctrinal terms without acknowledging the policy con-
cerns motivating it. In the subsequent Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting litigation, CBS sued a cable service that car-
ried signals from hundreds of miles away to communities already
served by local broadcasters.60 The equities and the economics of the
53. Id. at 391–92.
54. Wu, supra note 13, at 312 (“The goal of the early deployments was modest:
solving the problem of bringing broadcast television to remote or mountainous areas
otherwise left in the dark.”).
55. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 398–401.
56. Accord Wu, supra note 13, at 318.
57. See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199–201 (1931). But see
Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 396 n.18 (distinguishing Jewell-La Salle as a case where
the original radio broadcast had been unauthorized).
58. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 404–05 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 403.
60. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 396–97, 400
(1974).
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case were distinguishable from those of Fortnightly—viewers were not
lacking in other viewing options, and this sort of retransmission actu-
ally threatened to harm the existing market by diverting local stations’
ad revenues.61 Yet Fortnightly’s express holding—that cable retrans-
mission was not a performance—simultaneously deprived the net-
works of the chance to participate in these markets62 and removed the
economic factors on either side from judicial consideration.63
The networks’ defeat in these cases did not exclude them from the
cable market forever. After they lost in court, they turned to Con-
gress, much like the music industry had after White-Smith Music.64
Congress subsequently expanded “performance” under copyright law
to include cable retransmission and enacted another compulsory li-
cense.65 The networks fared well under this arrangement: they could
still run their commercials, secured by a statutory guarantee that the
cable networks could not alter the transmissions; they received a stat-
utory retransmission fee from the cable service; and their programs
ultimately reached a wider audience. Television as a medium also
thrived. The existence of a national audience generated the revenues
and viewership for a greater number and more diverse range of sta-
tions and for programming that served a wider range of tastes and
interests.66
2. Indirect Infringement
Many copyright suits target technology firms not because the firms
themselves committed infringement, but because their devices or ser-
vices facilitate infringement by consumers. Both of the following cases
involve a device that allowed consumers to engage with copyrighted
works in new ways. These devices created or stoked the market for
works in a compatible format, for example, prerecorded films for the
VCR. Rather than entering these markets, the copyright industries
sued to enjoin these devices out of a concern that, in addition to facili-
tating lawful uses, they could promote piracy. Unlike the plaintiffs in
the prior Section, these plaintiffs ultimately profited from the sale of
these devices without even having to go to Congress to broker a com-
promise. They simply relented and began selling copies of their works
61. Id. at 404–05, 410–14.
62. But see Wu, supra note 13, at 320 (documenting broadcasters who found a
backdoor means of participating by acquiring a share of ownership in the cable
systems).
63. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 413 n.15 (“[S]uch a showing would be of very little
relevance to the copyright question we decide here.”).
64. See generally Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Sub-
comm. on Pats., Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. at 278–490 (1973).
65. Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541, ch. 1, § 111.
66. See infra Section III.B.1.
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in the access market that had sprung into existence once consumers
had these devices in their homes.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios is the most famous of these
cases and it is the first and only case in this Section expressly decided
on fair-use grounds.67 Sony introduced its home VCR—the
Betamax—to the U.S. market in November 1975.68 Universal Studios
and Disney sued, alleging that Sony was responsible for the copyright
infringement that occurred when home users recorded their copy-
righted television programs.69 By some accounts, Universal’s plan was
to remove Sony’s VCR from the market in order to secure the market
for its parent company’s “DiscoVision.”70 The DiscoVision was a de-
vice that could only play prerecorded discs; consumers could not have
used it to record programming from their televisions.71
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sony.72 While many commen-
tators concur in the decision, there is some dispute over whether the
case stated a doctrinally sound rule.73 The Court announced a new
contributory liability test—the defendant would not be liable so long
as its device was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”74 This
test appears nowhere in the Copyright Act nor in pre-Sony copyright
precedent. The Court instead borrowed the doctrine from Subsection
271(c) of the Patent Act, asserting a “historic kinship between patent
law and copyright law.”75 Leading scholars have questioned both this
“kinship” and the resulting test. Peter Menell and David Nimmer, in
particular, point out the Court’s failure to consider alternatives
grounded in broader tort law principles, where courts have long wres-
tled with manufacturers’ liability for products that cause harm.76 The
substantial non-infringing use test has also proven difficult to apply in
67. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
68. JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 21 (1987); SONY CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1975).
69. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 419–20.
70. WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 150–51 (2009).
71. LARDNER, supra note 68, at 28–36. In this sense, the film industry’s conduct
parallels the early music industry’s attempts to monopolize the market for devices to
play music. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
72. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
73. See, e.g., Glynn Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82
B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002); Unwinding Sony, supra note 13, at 943, 993; Randal C.
Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST
BULL. 423, 424–25 (2002); see also Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 1391 (criticizing the
opinion as “cursory and result-oriented”).
74. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
75. Id. at 439.
76. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 13, at 1022 (“By applying tort law stan-
dards, the Court would have been faithful to congressional intent and would have
created a more flexible framework for addressing the challenges of new
technology.”).
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practice, and its indeterminacy has left courts with room to act on pol-
icy considerations without confronting them directly.77
Proceeding with the test, the Court’s assessment of whether the
Betamax had substantial non-infringing uses required examining
whether consumers’ home taping was lawful.78 The Copyright Act of
1976 defined “copies” more broadly than extant law at the time of
White-Smith, so there were no grounds for arguing that these record-
ings were not within the scope of the Act.79 Sony could avoid liability
only if these uses were permitted under the fair-use defense.80 The
Court was unequivocal in holding that it was fair use to “time-shift,”
that is, to tape programs for viewing at a more convenient time.81 Ac-
cordingly, Sony was absolved of liability.82
Despite losing, it seems the studios were better off in a world where
VCRs were in practically every home. There was no need for a subse-
quent, legislatively brokered compromise. Rather, studios benefited
because the proliferation of the VCR created a profitable market for
the studios to sell videocassettes of their films and programs directly
to consumers.83 It is unclear whether the studios’ preferred DiscoVi-
sion would have been as successful or as quick in pioneering this mar-
ket. Consumers were drawn to the VCR by the allure of time-shifting
or more dubious uses such as archiving; through time-shifting, con-
sumers had greater autonomy than ever before to decide what they
would watch and when they would watch it.84 These functions were so
attractive that literally millions of U.S. customers had already pur-
chased a VCR by the time Sony was decided.85
77. See infra Section II.B (discussing cases where the court ruled for the copyright
owner despite the existence of substantial non-infringing uses).
78. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442–44.
79. As the Copyright Act defines them:
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
80. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
81. Id. at 454–55. This did not mean all uses of the VCR were lawful; the Court
declined to decide the related question of whether it was fair for users to record pro-
grams indefinitely to build a home library. Id. at 483–84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 454–56.
83. LARDNER, supra note 68, at 325–28; EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED
STORY OF COPYRIGHT 70 (2000) (noting that the VCR had been “one of the most
lucrative inventions” for movie producers since the movie projector); see Menell &
Nimmer, supra note 8, at 148 (“Rather than destroy the film industry—as Jack Valenti
infamously predicted—the VCR proved a great boon to motion picture studios, con-
sumer electronics makers, and consumers alike.”) (citations omitted).
84. von Lohmann, supra note 17, at 841 (arguing that the record function was
necessary as startup capital or “bait” to convince American consumers to spend hun-
dreds of dollars on these devices and thereby create this market).
85. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05(F)(5)(b)(i) n.648 (2019) (noting that the number of video tape recorders had
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In Recording Industry Ass’n of America (“RIAA”) v. Diamond, the
Ninth Circuit considered another consumer playback device—the
MP3 player.86 This suit was unusual because it was not an infringe-
ment suit—Sony’s substantial non-infringing use test protected the
manufacturer here—but was instead a suit under the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”).87
The AHRA was a milestone in copyright lawmaking because it was
the first piece of copyright legislation that mandated the use of spe-
cific design features for a class of devices, namely, devices to record
and play digital music.88 The Act was also notable because the music
industry had lobbied proactively to regulate this technology before it
entered the consumer market.89 Consumers had long been able to
make analog copies, but copying on a medium like the cassette tape
had inherent limits due to degradation in quality.90 A consumer’s re-
recording of a song from the radio or from an authorized cassette
would produce an inferior copy, and any successive copies would be
worse still. The looming threat of digital copying was that it could cre-
ate an unlimited number of crystal-clear copies and thereby threaten
lawful markets with unconstrained bootlegging.91
The Act required any “digital audio recording device” to implement
a serial copy management system, which would allow the making of
copies from an original commercial disc but prevent consumers from
making any copies of the resulting second-generation discs.92 Given
the eventuality that some illicit copying would take place, the AHRA
also awarded the music industry a royalty to be levied on the sale of
digital audio recording devices as well as on blank tapes or discs.93
Litigation commenced because Diamond’s Rio MP3 player did not
implement the serial copy management system.94 Like White-Smith
nearly a century earlier, the case ultimately turned on a rather techni-
grown from 800,000 in 1978 to over 10 million in 1984); see also LARDNER, supra note
68, at 9 (finding the number had grown to at least 30 million by 1987).
86. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
87. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010) (2018)). Moreover, if the
plaintiff had been correct that the MP3 player qualified as a “digital audio recording
device” under the AHRA, a statutory safe harbor would have insulated the defendant
from liability for contributory copyright infringement without the need to invoke
Sony. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
88. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 118 (2004).
89. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 161.
90. RIAA, 180 F.3d at 1073.
91. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1002.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 1004. In a concession to device makers, the Act also provided im-
munity from suits for contributory copyright infringement on the basis of the manu-
facture, importation, or distribution of such devices and media. Id. § 1008.
94. RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1075.
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cal definition. The question was whether the MP3 player qualified
under the AHRA’s definition for “digital audio recording device”:
[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individ-
uals for use by individuals . . . the digital recording function of which
is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is ca-
pable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private
use . . . .95
The district court held that Rio qualified, reasoning that the Rio
makes a “digital audio copied recording” each time the user adds an
MP3 to the device.96
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation.97 It
reached this counterintuitive result—which “effectively eviscerate[s]
the AHRA” whenever a computer is involved98—because of a statu-
tory exemption. Even though an MP3 might otherwise seem to be a
digital recording, the AHRA contains an exemption for “material ob-
ject[s],” like hard drives, “in which one or more computer programs
are fixed.”99 The court found that this exemption precluded songs on a
computer hard drive from qualifying as “digital audio copied record-
ings” and, as such, held that the AHRA did not restrict what an MP3
player or any other device could do with those recordings.100
The 1992 Congress had simply not contemplated the involvement of
computers in home copying of music and drafted the law with only
contemporary digital audiotape systems in mind.101 One could have
imagined the Ninth Circuit engaging in a more purposive construction
of the statute to extend the AHRA into the MP3 era.102 After all, this
ruling made a law that was only seven years old functionally obsolete.
But the RIAA did not make for a sympathetic plaintiff. Its apparent
goal was to take the MP3 player off the market rather than to enter
the growing market for MP3 sales.103
95. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
96. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624, 631 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
97. RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1081.
98. RIAA I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 630; 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8B.02(A)(1)(b) (2019) (“This ruling . . . bears every indica-
tion of relegating the AHRA largely to obscurity.”).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B).
100. RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1078, 1081.
101. Bill D. Herman, A Political History of DRM and Related Copyright Debates,
1987–2012, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162, 174 (2012); David Nimmer, Codifying Copy-
right Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1333 (2004) (summarizing Congress’s
position as such: “no one but a geeky propeller-head would do something as bizarre
as to use the instrumentality of a PC to listen to music”).
102. See, e.g., RIAA I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (arguing that the RIAA should have
prevailed as a matter of “legislative history” and “the spirit and purpose of the
AHRA”); see also Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1626.
103. See Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1625–26.
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Whether the MP3 player ultimately helped or harmed the music in-
dustry presents a harder question than the VCR had.104 On its own,
the MP3 expanded the usefulness of music tracks by making them
more portable. While the Rio could only store an hour’s worth of mu-
sic, slightly less than a CD, later MP3 players would hold many times
that.105 Consumers might be willing to purchase more music CDs in a
world where they could carry a variety at all times. Conversely, the
MP3 player also had the potential to facilitate the sort of harm that
concerned the RIAA—imagine a college dorm where one resident
purchased a CD and then circulated it so everyone on the floor could
copy (“rip”) the tracks to their own computers or MP3 players.106 Less
than a year after the launch of the Rio, the problem was compounded
by the emergence of services like Napster that allowed for the unlaw-
ful distribution of MP3 files on a scale that was previously
unfathomable.107
MP3 players did, however, benefit the wider public by expanding
each individual’s capability to engage with creative works. In dicta,
the Ninth Circuit likened the “space-shifting” permitted by carrying
MP3s on the Rio player to the time-shifting endorsed in Sony.108 Ad-
vances in storage, as mentioned above, would enhance these space-
shifting capabilities by making it possible for consumers to carry an
entire library’s worth of CDs on one pocket-sized device, and with the
rise of smartphones many consumers now carry this library with them
at all times.
B. Copyright-Industry Plaintiff Prevails
The prior cases notwithstanding, the copyright industries often pre-
vail when they sue to enjoin new technologies for playback or distri-
bution. This holds true even where the technologies, or the new
markets opened by these technologies, are substantively similar to
those found non-infringing in the cases discussed above. The key dif-
ference has been the new markets’ impact on the copyright owners’
pre-existing markets. If the copyright owner has actually entered the
new market or made credible plans to do so, it is easy to see how third
104. But see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at 92 (“The Internet hasn’t killed
the music industry, which, by most accounts, is as profitable now as it’s ever been.”).
105. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1074–75.
106. Admittedly, even the AHRA’s serial copy management software would not
help in this scenario given that each college student would be making a first-genera-
tion copy from the original CD. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
107. The Rio entered the U.S. market in September 1998. Tony Smith, Ten Years
Old: The World’s First MP3 Player, REGISTER (Mar. 10, 2008, 12:33), https://
www.theregister.com/2008/03/10/ft_first_mp3_player/ [https://perma.cc/5YAP-4W4T].
Napster launched in June 1999. Tom Lamont, Napster: The Day the Music Was Set
Free, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2013, 7:05), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/feb/
24/napster-music-free-file-sharing [https://perma.cc/8X5U-LVPT]; see A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–15, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
108. RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1079.
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parties competing in that market could harm the copyright owner’s
interests. Even if the copyright owner has not entered the market, the
new market may pose a threat to existing markets to the extent that
consumers treat the defendant’s offerings as substitutes.
Radio broadcasting of music provides an early example. Composers
could have dug in their heels, as they had with the recording of music
in White-Smith, and refused to allow radio stations to air their songs.
Instead, they formed the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers (“ASCAP”) to license their compositions for public
performances, including radio broadcasts.109 Because they had already
entered the market, there was no need for a court to compel them to
do so. Likewise, unauthorized broadcasts resulted in a concrete harm
to ASCAP’s established licensing business. It was thus no surprise that
the composers won when they sued radio broadcasters who refused to
pay the licensing fee.110
Napster and subsequent file-sharing platforms further demonstrate
this point. The music industry in the late 1990s was reluctant to au-
thorize the sale and download of MP3s for several years after the
technology became viable. It had legitimate concerns that putting
MP3s into wide circulation would facilitate piracy.111 At the same
time, the music industry’s refusal to enter the market meant consum-
ers could not benefit from the convenience of digital sales. Likewise, it
meant that the industry could still push the sale of full CD albums
even though many consumers would have preferred to purchase sin-
gles.112 Services like Napster, Aimster, and Grokster entered this void
by providing consumers with the means to download MP3s, but they
did so without compensating the copyright holders.113
When the industry sued to shut these sites down, the industry won
even though the sites arguably fell within Sony’s safe harbor for ser-
vices with substantial non-infringing uses.114 Napster was the first of
these services to invoke Sony’s safe harbor as a defense.115 The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged Napster’s non-infringing capabilities: A small
fraction of music downloads on the service were lawful because they
109. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1329 (1996).
110. See Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411,
411–12 (6th Cir. 1925).
111. See Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion:
Supplemental Measures the Recording Industry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy, 8
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 1–3, 6–7, 10–11 (2000).
112. See id. at 2–3, 13.
113. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1014 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920–21 (2005).
114. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020; Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652; Grokster, 545 U.S. at
927–28.
115. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
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involved tracks that artists had released for promotional purposes.116
The court nonetheless rejected the defense because Napster, unlike
Sony, had “actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was]
available using its system.”117 After all, it structured its entire service
around a centralized directory listing all the songs available, making
the infringing activity plain to its operators.118
Aimster’s developers attempted to sidestep this problem by en-
crypting all user communications so that Aimster itself would be una-
ble to witness any specific instances of infringement.119 To be sure,
there are many legitimate reasons for a service to encrypt users’ com-
munications.120 Aimster’s problem was that encryption added no ap-
parent value to the file-sharing program, making it transparent to the
court that it added the feature only in an attempt to evade copyright
liability.121 The Seventh Circuit ruled against Aimster, finding that
“willful blindness” made it just as culpable as Napster had been.122
Grokster followed a similar but less convoluted path: Rather than
encrypting communications, it utilized a direct, peer-to-peer design
that was different than Napster’s because it did not require a central
directory.123 This meant Grokster had no knowledge of infringement.
Grokster also had a more legitimate explanation than Aimster for
why it designed the service this way: The peer-to-peer architecture
eliminated the overhead expenses of maintaining a central server.124
This argument convinced the Ninth Circuit, but not the Supreme
Court.125 Without getting into the particulars of the technology, the
Court found Grokster could be held liable because it expressly adver-
tised its own services as a replacement for Napster’s and therefore
faced liability for inducing infringement.126
116. See id. at 1019.
117. Id. at 1021–22.
118. See id. at 1011–12.
119. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646, 650.
120. See id. at 650.
121. See id. at 653.
122. Id. at 650.
123. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921–22
(2005).
124. Id. at 920.
125. Id. at 927–28 (discussing the Ninth Circuit opinion, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
analogized the case to the prior disputes over the player piano, VC3, and MP3 player.
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167.
126. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 938–41. Napster and Aimster would likely also have been
liable under this test. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5
(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]hey have promoted the site with ‘screen shots listing infringing
files.’”); Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651 (“In explaining how to use the Aimster software, the
tutorial gives as its only examples of file sharing the sharing of copyrighted music
. . . .”).
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Doctrinally, it may seem like the courts repeatedly moved the goal-
posts beyond the test announced in Sony.127 They were focused not on
the technical particulars of each service’s design but instead on their
economic impact, specifically the substitutionary harms that arose
when these services poached customers who may otherwise have paid
for music.128 Unlike the VCR and MP3 player, these services’ primary
use was not to engage with works the users had already accessed or
acquired in a lawful manner. Instead, each service created an unau-
thorized distribution network that competed with the existing CD
market. In this regard, the file-sharing defendants were doing some-
thing very different than the defendants in White-Smith or Fortnightly,
who also engaged in distribution but aimed their activities at an inde-
pendent market.129
The file-sharing defendants faced additional problems because the
music industry could argue it had not actually rejected the market for
digital downloads; it simply needed time to implement adequate pre-
cautions against potential piracy. Apple struck a deal with the record-
ing industry and launched the iTunes music store in March 2003,
ahead of the Aimster and Grokster decisions.130 Even though the
iTunes store did not launch until after Napster was decided, the record
labels could explain their delay up to that point by referencing their
longstanding concern that selling MP3s would facilitate piracy. Even if
the labels placed copy protections on the files, hackers would inevita-
bly release tools to circumvent these protections. Congress legitimated
this concern when it passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), which made distributing such tools illegal as of October
1998.131 Napster launched one year later, during a window when the
industry had only just secured legal protection and could credibly
claim that it simply needed a bit more time to prepare for entry.132
127. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 187 (“Instead of applying the staple
article of commerce doctrine as formulated [in Sony], courts . . . have contorted their
analyses to find liable those whose conduct appears blameworthy, even if that behav-
ior nominally would fall within Sony’s safe harbor.”).
128. But see id. (suggesting that any consideration of economic impact was the in-
advertent effect of assessing the parties’ blameworthiness).
129. See infra Section IV.A.1.
130. See Jon Healey, Labels Think Apple Has Perfect Pitch, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-04-fi-music4-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Z6PB-XGVA].
131. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
132. It is possible that conservative forces in the music industry would have resisted
the move toward commercial distribution of digital downloads through sites like
iTunes if they had not faced the threat of Napster. See infra Section III.C (exploring
the reasons behind the copyright industries’ reluctance). Sites like Napster simultane-
ously undermined the existing market and demonstrated the existence of consumer
demand for the convenience of purchasing music without going to the store and of
purchasing tracks a la carte rather than full albums. See von Lohmann, supra note 17,
at 854–55 (“In several instances, new markets formed only after disruptive technolo-
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My.MP3.com tested the limits of the time-shifting and space-shift-
ing arguments previously asserted in Sony and Diamond.133 Defen-
dant MP3.com advertised its My.MP3.com service as one that would
allow the user to store and listen to one’s CDs from any internet-con-
nected computer.134 So far as the user could see, the service provided
functionality similar to a modern cloud-storage system like Dropbox;
the consumer could add CDs to a personalized virtual “storage
locker” of MP3 files to access from any internet-connected computer.
There was nonetheless one key difference between My.MP3.com’s op-
erations and cloud storage. The user did not actually copy or upload
music files to My.MP3.com. Instead, the user submitted proof of own-
ership of the CD and then My.MP3.com granted access to the corre-
sponding tracks the site had saved to a central database.135 Several
music studios sued, alleging that creating and streaming from this li-
brary constituted infringement, while MP3.com argued it merely pro-
vided a new form of “space-shifting” for consumers who had lawfully
purchased the CDs.136
The district court rejected the space-shifting arguments and treated
this as a straightforward case of infringement.137 Once again, examin-
ing the service’s effect on the market is instructive. A major failing of
MP3.com’s system was that its proof-of-purchase system did not actu-
ally guarantee the user paid for the music; the system required the
user to insert the CD into his or her computer in order to verify it, but
it could not actually distinguish between retail and bootleg CDs.138
Likewise, it had no means of tracking any given CD copy, so a group
of acquaintances could easily purchase one disc and pass it around to
obtain digital access without even the hassle of actually burning a CD.
These were exactly the sorts of harms that the industry had been try-
ing to avert through the implementation of copy protections, and Con-
gress had legitimated these concerns through both the AHRA and
DMCA.139 Even though iTunes and other comparable space-shifting
services would not arrive until a few years after the decision, the court
accepted the industry’s claim that negotiations were underway.
MP3.com was a more sympathetic defendant than Napster, but the
gies forced copyright owners to adjust their behavior, triggering the complementary
relationship between the products.”). The potential “market-forcing” effect of piracy
is beyond the scope of the present article.
133. See supra notes 81–83, 106 and accompanying text.
134. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 351.
137. Id. at 350 (“The complex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create
difficult legal issues; but not in this case.”).
138. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, at § 13.05(G); see also UMG Recordings,
92 F. Supp. 2d at 350 (expressing doubt regarding what MP3.com required the user to
“prove”).
139. See supra notes 85–92, 129–130 and accompanying text.
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credible threat of harm to the copyright owners’ existing markets,
along with the owners’ stated plans to enter the new market, were
once again fatal.
* * *
Viewing these cases as plain instances of legal realism is tempt-
ing.140 Descriptively, the characterization is accurate.141 Copyright
cases—especially those involving new technologies—can be exceed-
ingly technical both factually and as a matter of doctrine, yet the
courts are remarkably consistent in favoring the party that seems to be
acting more reasonably. There is good reason to be wary of this trend,
which invites judges to decide copyright cases according to their sub-
jective evaluation of fairness. Not all copying constitutes infringement,
and equating copying with wrongdoing is all too easy without careful
attention to the Copyright Act. Likewise, it is not categorically unrea-
sonable for a copyright owner to refuse to grant a license for a use, or
a market, no matter how bad this looks for an owner who has no in-
tention of exploiting that use.
Our legal system nonetheless relies on courts to effectuate copy-
right’s policy goals. It is both legitimate and necessary for courts to
consider these objectives for illumination in interpreting and applying
the Copyright Act. The reasonableness or commercial morality of ei-
ther party is beside the point. What matters from the perspective of
copyright is the impact of the parties’ market decisions on the creation
of new works and consumers’ access to both existing and future
works. As the following Part shows, the courts’ tendency to deny relief
to copyright plaintiffs who refuse to enter a new access market is
sound policy for advancing these concerns.
III. COPYRIGHT POLICY
The access markets made possible by new playback and distribution
technologies advance copyright policy in several distinct ways. To be
sure, they advance both creation incentives and access as those terms
are conventionally understood. But examining these markets also
reveals the role that access to existing works plays in advancing copy-
right’s deeper normative goals of promoting a more democratic and
participatory society: It enhances the availability of diverse works, al-
lows for more autonomous engagement with works, and includes pre-
viously marginalized groups within a larger, shared culture. The
140. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 187 (opining that Sony’s “legacy
speaks more to the precepts of legal realism than the vitality of copyright’s staple
article of commerce doctrine”).
141. See Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1617; Wu, supra note 13, at 334–35 (“As Jane
Ginsburg has argued, many of the pro-challenger Supreme Court decisions, from
White-Smith to Fortnightly, can be impossible to understand without some idea that
the Court feared that the incumbent wanted copyright for the wrong reasons.”).
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following discussion draws on the cases unpacked in Part II to explain
how new access markets can secure these benefits. Having established
why copyright law should promote these markets, it then addresses
the reasons why the copyright industries resist them.
A. Copyright Fundamentals
1. Incentives for Creation
Copyright is generally understood as a means of providing financial
incentives for creative production.142 Today’s Hollywood blockbusters
cost as much as $500 million to produce and market.143 The studios
produce these films expecting to make all that back, plus profits,
through the sale of movie tickets, DVD and Blu-ray Discs, streaming
rights, tie-in merchandising, and the like. Copyright is a crucial part of
this business strategy because it allows the studio to stop third parties
from undercutting it by selling bootleg DVDs or posting the film
online.
So far as creation incentives are concerned, the key question in
market refusal cases is whether denying copyright protection will im-
pair the production of new works. Recent scholarship has shown that
some individual creators would continue to produce even with dimin-
ished financial rewards.144 While this holds true for individual creators
who have reputational, intrinsic, or social reasons to create, it does not
for investors whose goal is to maximize profit. In the Hollywood ex-
ample, those backers who view films as investments would redirect
their capital toward other types of projects or even other industries if
the expected returns dipped below an acceptable threshold.145
142. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“Intellectual property protection in the United States
has always been about generating incentives to create.”).
143. See, e.g., Kirsten Acuna, The 30 Most Expensive Movies Ever Made, INSIDER
(July 2, 2020, 7:04 PM), https://www.insider.com/most-expensive-movies-ever-made
[https://perma.cc/EE57-WK6N] (collecting publicly available data on production and
marketing costs).
144. See, e.g., GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE
U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY 128–56 (2018) (finding that recording artists have actu-
ally produced a greater number of high-quality albums when revenues were lower);
Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influ-
enza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (assessing case studies on “intellec-
tual production without intellectual property” across creative fields such as French
cuisine, comedy, stage magic, tattooing, high fashion, and even the selection of roller
derby pseudonyms); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 426–27 (2002) (cataloging the sorts of direct
and indirect pecuniary rewards, intrinsic hedonic rewards, and social-psychological
rewards that move people to create).
145. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 143 (“Copyright creates a foundation for predict-
ability in the organization of cultural production, something particularly important in
capital-intensive industries like film production . . . .”).
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New access markets can enhance these incentives by bringing in ad-
ditional profits. This occurred in the cases described above, where the
courts pushed the copyright industries into markets they refused to
enter voluntarily.146 Advocates for new technologies often point to
Hollywood: Once VCRs became widespread, revenues from video
sales quickly outpaced those of theater tickets.147 The studios were
dogged in their opposition, yet their total profits increased once they
relented and began selling films for home video.148 As discussed
above, the music and broadcast-television industries also grew and
profited after adverse copyright decisions forced them to enter new
markets.149 It may be that intermediaries or older ways of doing busi-
ness were displaced, but these concerns are separate from production
incentives.150 So long as more profits ultimately reach the creators—
the authors, the producers, and the investors—the production of new
works is encouraged. By the same logic, the copyright industries’ pro-
duction incentives would be enhanced even if they did suffer harm in
an existing market so long as their profits in the new market out-
weighed their losses. Ultimately, what matters is the net result.151
Even if copyright owners did not affirmatively profit from a new
market, their production incentives would not be diminished so long
as they suffered no net loss. While the copyright industries might pre-
fer to capture the full value of their works across time, economists and
copyright experts generally agree that complete internalization of the
value of one’s work goes beyond the level of compensation necessary
to incentivize production.152 As Shyamkrishna Balganesh has ex-
plained, creators’ pecuniary interests are satisfied so long as they
recoup all the profits they expected at the time they made the decision
to invest time and money in the work.153 If creators can expect compa-
146. Supra Part II.
147. See LARDNER, supra note 68, at 325–28.
148. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 43–48, 62–64 and accompanying text.
150. See infra Section III.C.1.
151. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV.
615, 632 (2015) (“A full-bodied assessment of market effects fits better with the poli-
cies underpinning copyright law and fair use than an assessment that looks to market
harms alone.”); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 853
(2010) (arguing “court[s] should consider the technology’s possible positive effects”
when assessing market impact) (emphasis omitted).
152. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 258 (2007) (“[T]here is no reason to think that complete internalization of
externalities is necessary to optimize investment incentives . . . .”); Oren Bracha &
Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copy-
right Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1855 (2014) (“[A]t any given level of IP protec-
tion, some innovations or informational works will enjoy more protection than is
needed for their generation, meaning that the revenues enabled by the IP-conferred
pricing power will exceed the capitalized costs of development.”).
153. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1615 (2009). One might raise non-pecuniary concerns—what if
an author objected to the new technological uses as a matter of artistic integrity? To
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rable net returns, there is no economic reason for the copyright indus-
tries to reduce their investment in production.154 A new market could
be neutral for production incentives and still advance copyright’s
objectives if it led to greater access.
2. Access to Works
The other piece of the traditional incentives-access paradigm is ac-
cess; the public benefits from the creation of new works only once it
obtains access to them. It is clear to see how the markets opened by
new playback and distribution technologies advance this objective.
Such access is often achieved by permitting a third party to bring the
work into a market that the copyright owner refused. As the preced-
ing Section explained, sometimes this expansion is also beneficial to
the copyright owner because it generates greater total revenues. Even
if the copyright owner were harmed, however, these harms could be
justified within the incentives-access paradigm if there were a suffi-
ciently large increase in access to offset the reduction in incentives.155
As the following Section explains, these markets also have the poten-
tial to promote copyright objectives by providing the sorts of rich ac-
cess that support a more democratic and participatory culture.
be clear, the market-entry policy advanced by the courts and by this Article is not one
that second guesses authors’ creative decisions; it is an argument that copyright own-
ers should not have absolute control over the format in which their published works
may be enjoyed, not one for depriving authors of creative control over the authoriza-
tion of sequels, film adaptations, or even remastering of their older works, nor for
compelling any author to release unpublished work.
Still, one might be concerned if authors objected to the formats themselves. Copy-
right policy would not be well-served if composers stopped writing songs because they
objected to the possibility that those songs would one day be encoded in the MP3
format. While interesting as a possibility, authors’ preferences, as revealed by their
behavior, suggest it is not a major concern. Composers like John Philip Sousa had dire
predictions regarding the implications of recorded music, yet continued composing for
over twenty years after the decision in White-Smith. See Arguments Before the
Comms. on Patents of the S. & H.R., Conjointly, on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19,853,
to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. 23 (1906) (state-
ment of John Philip Sousa). Directors like Woody Allen objected to the sorts of modi-
fications that had to be made to his films to fit the square television screens of the
1980s, but these were objections to the Hollywood production model rather than any
unauthorized market; directors continue to shoot films even though the studios hold
the copyright, and even though these studios have authorized extensive edits for tele-
vision broadcast and later home video. See Legal Issues That Arise When Color Is
Added to Films Originally Produced, Sold, and Distributed in Black and White: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Tech. & the Law, S. Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 44
(1987) (testimony of Woody Allen).
154. There may be non-economic reasons for resentment: If actors in the creative
industries are as well off as they were before, but they perceive others who profit
from their works as free-riding, it may have a demoralizing effect. Cf. Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–18 (1967) (treating eminent
domain as a problem of compensating property owners sufficiently to avoid demorali-
zation and the ensuing reduction of investment in property).
155. See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 326.
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B. Why Access Matters
The reigning paradigm in IP scholarship—indeed most legal schol-
arship—reflects a style of economic analysis where the primary goal is
to increase social utility in the aggregate.156 Within this paradigm, the
ideal copyright regime is typically the one that allows consumers to
most efficiently satisfy their media preferences. The proliferation of
new access markets can and does advance this objective by expanding
both creative incentives and access, as described above. But the analy-
sis need not end there.
Growing numbers of IP scholars argue for a richer account of what
copyright is and ought to be doing. Neil Netanel has argued that we
should use copyright law to advance a democratic civil society; the
balance of incentives and access matters in this view because it can
determine which viewpoints find expression in the media and shape
public discourse.157 Scholars like Jack Balkin, Julie Cohen, and Larry
Lessig have shown how similar concerns arise with culture; our collec-
tive engagement with creative works has important implications for
how we make meaning of the world and ourselves.158 Amy Kapczyn-
ski and Madhavi Sunder have enriched the economic account of intel-
lectual property by asking whether it promotes human flourishing and
what it means for underserved communities in the United States and
throughout the world.159
The contributions that new playback and distribution technologies
can offer in the face of these demands on the copyright system are
modest but important. History has shown that the expansion of these
markets made it easier for any given work to reach a wide audience,
contributing to greater diversity in media. The public also has gained
more autonomy in choosing which works to engage with and on what
terms. And wider viewership has supported the rise of a more inclu-
sive media culture.
1. Diversity
Greater diversity in media offerings—the availability of more works
in both sheer number and breadth of perspectives—facilitates the sort
of participatory culture that copyright strives to achieve.160 The role of
156. See COHEN, supra note 20, at 21.
157. See Netanel, supra note 21, at 364 (“Copyright’s fundamental purpose is to
underwrite political competency, with allocative efficiency a secondary
consideration.”).
158. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 39; LESSIG, supra note 21, at 114; COHEN,
supra note 21, at 103.
159. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 20, at 990; Sunder, supra note 20, at 325.
160. Netanel, supra note 21, at 341; see Sunder, supra note 20, at 269 (“Intellectual
property is increasingly understood as a legal vehicle for facilitating (or thwarting)
recognition of diverse contributors to cultural and scientific discourse.”).
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new access markets in promoting this diversity stems from two distinct
but overlapping effects on creators.
First, new markets often create new revenue streams as described
above with respect to sound recordings, cable retransmission, and
VCRs.161 Standard economic analysis of copyright predicts that this
increase in revenue will motivate the production of more or higher-
quality works,162 and the emergent effect of this increase in produc-
tion is to provide consumers more variety.
Second, the expansion of access markets reduces intermediaries’
power to decide which creators will be permitted to reach an audi-
ence.163 This change arises partly due to technology-related reductions
in the economic costs of distribution. In a media environment where
only trained musicians could translate sheet music into an aural per-
formance, it was costly to assemble a group of professional musicians
to play a piece. Relatively few songs could make it into wide circula-
tion. With the advent of sound recordings, composers and performers
obtained a much more cost-effective means for distributing songs, and
a greater variety could circulate. The costs have dropped further still
with digital distribution, allowing artists to reach their audiences with-
out the need to win the approval of a studio or other intermediary.164
Scholars have expressed optimism that these capabilities will lead to a
flourishing of independent writers, bands, and visual artists.165
The increased likelihood of reaching an audience is also a function
of competition between the old intermediaries and the new distribu-
tors. When only three broadcast television networks were available,
network executives had broad discretion to choose which programs to
feature and could systematically favor works coming from affiliated
studios to the exclusion of any creators working outside that sys-
tem.166 When cable television introduced more channels, each new
161. See supra notes 48, 64, 80–83, 102–106 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section III.A.1. Such revenues are, of course, not uniformly distrib-
uted, and incumbents will inevitably lose sales or potential sales to the newcomers.
See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at 104. The losers in this process often assert
copyright claims in an attempt to stave off this competition. Id. at 104–05; von Loh-
mann, supra note 17, at 851; see also Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change,
the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56
STAN. L. REV. 531, 552 (2003). These copyright suits are misplaced. This Article re-
turns to these and related concerns in Section III.C.1, infra.
163. See also infra Section III.C (describing how removal of intermediaries also
advances innovation).
164. Netanel, supra note 21, at 361 (“Expressive content broadcast over the air
is . . . less diverse and creator autonomy far more constrained than in sectors where
consumers buy creative works directly.”).
165.See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 1646–47; Netanel, supra note 21, at
364–65.
166. See Netanel, supra note 21, at 360 (“[C]orporate patrons are notorious for
supporting expression that furthers their own objectives at the expense of artistic au-
tonomy and diversity.”); id. at 362 (describing problems that media conglomerates
pose for democratic public discourse).
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channel became an outlet for featuring other works or catering to
more particularized tastes. In addition, competition among channels
penalized the networks if they chose based on mere affiliation rather
than audience demand. Greater market competition by no means
guarantees quality, but it makes for more diverse programming than
the alternative.
2. Autonomy
New access markets have also enhanced consumers’ autonomy. Part
of this autonomy comes from an increased capability to choose which
works to consume as a function of the greater diversity of works de-
scribed in the preceding Section. The proliferation of new works in-
creases the likelihood that people will be able to find content
consistent with their values as well as content that challenges them to
confront viewpoints outside the mainstream.
These markets have also utilized technologies that enhance users’
capabilities to engage with those works that would have been pro-
duced under the prior status quo. Through time-shifting, the humble
VCR gave consumers greater autonomy to decide what they would
watch and when they would watch it.167 Fred Rogers, of Mr. Rogers’
Neighborhood, stated the point provocatively:
I think that it’s a real service to families to be able to record such
programs and show them at appropriate times. . . . Very frankly, I am
opposed to people being programmed by others.168
We do not ordinarily describe people being “programmed” except
in science fiction. But what we watch and listen to shapes us.169 This
may be especially true for children, though contemporary observa-
tions on the effects of “fake news” on politics remind us that adults,
too, bear the imprint of their media diet.170 Devices like the VCR and
the MP3 player allow consumers to take greater control of their own
programming. The autonomy to decide what to consume on the basis
of its content, rather than the time it airs or which of our media de-
vices we happen to be carrying, is one step toward a more democratic
and participatory culture.
The potential for new access capabilities to advance autonomy is
also evident when we consider needs that have not been satisfied.
When Amazon released the Kindle 2 e-reader tablet in 2009, it in-
cluded text-to-speech (“TTS”), a feature that allowed users to engage
167. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
168. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445 n.27
(1984).
169. COHEN, supra note 20, at 25.
170. Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
845, 850 (2018) (“[B]ecause of the way we process information, once a story is heard,
even retractions are ill equipped to change our minds.”).
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a computerized voice to read e-books aloud.171 While this struck many
readers as a novelty, TTS was transformative for people with blind-
ness, visual impairment, or learning disorders that interfere with read-
ing because they could purchase or borrow e-books like any other
reader and engage with the text on their own terms.172 People with
disabilities also gained the benefits of greater inclusion—the subject
of the next Section. But these gains were short-lived, as Amazon dis-
abled the feature later the same year in response to complaints from
the Authors’ Guild.173 The copyright owners now have the power to
decide whether or not to enable TTS for any given title.174
3. Inclusion
Another important consequence of cheaper, more widespread dis-
tribution is that it has brought access to news and popular culture to
previously excluded communities. This effect is most obvious in a sce-
nario like Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, where broad-
casters effectively refused to build broadcast antennas that could
reach communities in the mountainous regions of West Virginia.175
Cable retransmission made it economically feasible for these commu-
nities to gain access even without further investment from the net-
works. A similar effect has also followed advances in sound and video
recording technologies. People who have historically lacked the ability
to attend performance venues—like rural communities too far from a
theater, or low-income residents even in a culturally rich metropolitan
area—have gained the capacity to hear the same music and see the
same films with less travel and at lower cost.
This expansion of access has emergent effects. Beyond allowing
more people to engage with a wider range of works, it also promotes
informed democratic participation and fosters social cohesion. Com-
mentators look back to the 1960s and 1970s as a time when the entire
nation, despite their differences, tuned in to the CBS Evening News
with Walter Cronkite: “And that’s the way it [was].”176 Yet millions of
171. Kyle Wiens, E-Book Legal Restrictions Are Screwing Over Blind People,
WIRED (Dec. 15, 2014, 6:40 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/e-books-for-the-
blind-should-be-legal/ [https://perma.cc/9N8D-SA6T].
172. See Lee, supra note 151, at 801. This is just one episode in the much larger
conflict between copyright law and adaptation of works into accessible formats. See
Blake E. Reid, Copyright and Disability 1, 30, 54 (Aug. 29, 2020) (unpublished manu-
script), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3381201 [https://perma.cc/C73W-GRNV].
173. Lee, supra note 151, at 865.
174. Id. at 865–66.
175. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391 (1968);
see supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
176. Dan Rottenberg, And That’s the Way It Is, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (May
1994), https://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=3612&id=3612 [https://perma.cc/Q6BZ-
EPW7] (“Walter Cronkite’s consistency and integrity transformed television from a
novelty into the primary news source for millions of Americans.”). See also Paul
Schiff Berman et al., A Law Faculty Listens to Serial, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1598
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Americans lived in regions where CBS did not broadcast.177 Without
local cable providers, these people would have been excluded from
that national conversation. Cable retransmission and similar technolo-
gies have allowed more communities to participate in shared political
discourse.
The diffusion of culture has followed a similar pattern. Technologies
like the radio took sporting events outside the arena to become re-
gional and ultimately national affairs. Mass culture arose from peo-
ple’s common exposure to the same media and gave people who
otherwise had very different life experiences new ways to relate to one
another.178 While much of popular entertainment might be derided as
mindless, even “bad” entertainment can provide a valuable spring-
board for parody and other criticism because so many people are fa-
miliar with it.179 In one of the leading fair-use cases, for example, the
Supreme Court observed that the popularity of Roy Orbison’s 1964
rock ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman” set the stage for a bawdy rap parody
that mocked “the white-bread original” as not only “bland and banal,”
but also ignorant of women’s experiences in the way it romanticized a
man catcalling a woman on the street.180 Works like these that criticize
popular works and expose their unexamined values are among the
most celebrated in both copyright and First Amendment theory.181
But the criticism is only effective because distribution markets have
allowed for mass recognition of the original.
* * *
The expansion of access markets may advance copyright policy, but
that observation alone does not tell us how courts ought to treat mar-
ket refusal. Admittedly, the equities were not on the copyright indus-
tries’ side in several of the cases discussed in Part II; they repeatedly
tried to shut down or monopolize new markets rather than participate
(2016) (“Once upon a time, there was Walter Cronkite, the voice of authority and
truth.”).
177. See CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES: COMMUNITY CONTROL, PUBLIC AC-
CESS, AND MINORITY OWNERSHIP 12 (Charles Tate ed., 1971) (documenting 850,000
household subscriptions across 800 local cable operators by 1962).
178. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 148 (“Mass culture has a value that goes beyond
the merely economic; it is what gives us things to talk about with one another, to
celebrate or criticize, and to define ourselves against.”).
179. COHEN, supra note 20, at 97 (“Mass culture . . . forms the substrate for much
that is proudly labeled alternative culture.”); Netanel, supra note 21, at 350 (“It is part
entertainment, but as it entertains, it often reveals contested issues and deep fissures
within our society, just as it may reinforce widely held beliefs and values.”).
180. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 573, 582 (1994).
181. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 549 (2004) (“Critical, trans-
formative uses of copyrighted works against their owners’ wills are analogous to the
speech of political protestors attacking received wisdom, whose actions are generally
thought to be at the heart of the First Amendment’s protections.”).
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in them.182 It is nonetheless plausible that a rule guaranteeing control
of these markets to the copyright owner—rather than leaving the mat-
ter uncertain prior to litigation—would lead to more innovations in
playback and distribution. In other words, perhaps the copyright in-
dustries would be the ones introducing VCRs and cable television if
only they could rely on the promise of exclusive control over the re-
sulting markets. The following Section explains why that result seems
unlikely.
C. Copyright’s Innovation Policy
A legal regime where third parties are allowed to introduce new
playback and distribution technologies is more likely to produce new
and valuable access markets than a system where all such develop-
ment must come from the copyright industries. As a general matter,
experts have long disputed whether competition is good for innova-
tion.183 Those arguing against competition point to historical examples
where firms, freed from the pressures of market competition, directed
their resources toward research and development;184 those on the
other side point to the creativity unleashed when innovators are free
to enter a market without needing the permission of incumbent
firms.185 This Article stakes no position in that larger debate and in-
stead focuses on the dynamics of access markets. Three features of
these markets suggest that open competition is superior in this partic-
ular context.
1. Industry Conservatism
First, the copyright industries have historically resisted entering ac-
cess markets.186 This is due partly to a myopic failure to predict new
182. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text (arguing that the courts may
have ruled against the copyright industries because they viewed these industries’ be-
havior as unreasonable or opportunistic).
183. Lemley, supra note 142, at 1060.
184. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
100–02 (3d ed. 1962); Wu, supra note 13, at 329–30; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) (arguing
that the goal of attaining monopoly profits is a productive incentive in IP); Christo-
pher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 215–16
(arguing the same).
185. See, e.g., BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVA-
TION 320–28 (2010) (explaining why new entrants to a market may introduce innova-
tions that established firms would not); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End
of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48
UCLA L. REV. 925, 945 (2001) (“Innovators are likely to be cautious about how they
spend their research efforts if they know that one company has the power to control
whether that innovation will ever be deployed.”); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Eco-
nomic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DI-
RECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 619 (1962)
(arguing the monopoly power of incumbents discourages further innovation).
186. See supra Section II.A.
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markets’ profitability and partly to a knee-jerk threat response with
respect to existing delivery channels. In the absence of outside compe-
tition, these factors would impede innovation from the industry
players.
In retrospect, the copyright industries’ attempts to eliminate sound
recordings, cable television, and VCRs are puzzling. Why did the
plaintiffs fight so hard against technologies that would prove to be
wildly profitable for them?187 One possibility is that they simply did
not contemplate this sort of success. Fred von Lohmann traces this
failure of prediction to the “innovator’s dilemma,” the late Clayton
Christensen’s explanation for why incumbent firms refuse to invest in
disruptive technologies and instead treat them as threats.188 Studios
tend not to be the initial developers of the technologies because, even
assuming that research and development expenses are small, the pay-
off is too speculative to justify diverting funds away from producing
new content or making incremental improvements in existing
technologies.189
The explanation for why the copyright industries treat these tech-
nologies as a threat even after they are developed requires more un-
packing. Disruptive technologies, within Christensen’s framework, are
those that substantially displace what came before.190 This is the tra-
jectory of something like the telephone, which displaced the tele-
graph, or the cellphone camera, which has practically eliminated
consumer demand for low- and mid-range stand-alone cameras. Cre-
ators—artists and their financial backers—are not threatened in this
sense. They will not be displaced simply because their work is distrib-
uted in one medium versus another; their concern is only that they
continue to be paid when the audience moves from one way of con-
suming media to another.
The true threat of displacement arises for distributors within the
copyright industries.191 Executives who are in charge of licensing films
187. See supra notes 48, 64, 80–83, 102–106 and accompanying text.
188. von Lohmann, supra note 17, at 844–53. See generally CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN,
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO
FAIL (1997).
189. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 188, at xx–xxi, 125, 132–38; von Lohmann, supra
note 17, at 846–47.
190. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 188, at xiv–xvii. Christensen also restricts the defini-
tion of “disruptive technology” to include only those technologies that initially appeal
to a niche market rather than mainstream customers. Id. at 42–48. This helps further
explain why incumbent firms fail to see the value of the technologies and therefore
fail to invest in them at the outset. See id. at 104–05 (suggesting that incumbent firms
counter these trends by forming smaller subsidiaries to pursue these opportunities).
191. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at 93 (“Content owners get paid—and in
many cases significantly more—but existing intermediaries might not.”); see also Jes-
sica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2010) (“As expensive
methods of distribution yield to inexpensive alternatives, the justification for giving
distributors the lion’s share of the copyright fades.”).
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for television broadcast, or pressing CDs, may worry that the VCR or
MP3 will upend their existing distribution networks. Even if creators
continue to claim the same royalties, losses among distributors may
trigger industry-wide concern because of extensive relationships or co-
ownership of both creative and distributive operations within the cop-
yright industries.192 Sony—the defendant in the famous Betamax
case—now produces both electronics and copyrighted media, includ-
ing films and video games.193
In hindsight, it is clear that only some playback and distribution
technologies have actually displaced incumbent distributors; movie
ticket sales and licensure for TV continued to be profitable after the
introduction of the VCR, for example, while sales of physical CDs
have fallen as consumers have moved to digital downloads and
streaming.194 The copyright industries have nonetheless erred on the
side of caution in resisting many of these technologies, perhaps be-
cause they were simply mistaken in their predictions or perhaps be-
cause risk-aversion or some set of cognitive biases has led them to
favor the status quo.195
2. Spillovers
Second, innovations in playback and distribution technologies gen-
erate many positive externalities, or “spillovers,” that enrich the pub-
lic without a commensurate reward to those who develop the
innovation.196 This means the financial incentives for the innovator
are less than the total social value of the invention. While this may
limit the appeal for any party to develop the technology, this is espe-
cially problematic for the copyright industries because they already
discount the value of new playback and distribution markets for the
reasons described in the preceding Section.
192. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 161 (“[W]e might posit that the intermediary copy-
right industries are prone to favoring their own interests over those of authors and
that this tendency requires appropriate structural correction.”); Lemley & McKenna,
supra note 19, at 93.
193. Who We Are, SONY, https://www.sony.com/en_us/SCA/who-we-are/over-
view.html [https://perma.cc/9BP2-TLBF].
194. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at 93.
195. While most scholars now accept the argument that individual consumers sys-
tematically deviate from strictly rational decision-making, there is some resistance to
the notion that firms are also subject to cognitive bias. Yet the reasoning behind this
resistance is unclear. True, in their interactions with consumers, firms have better in-
formation and are more likely to be deliberative rather than impulsive. Mark Arm-
strong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics and Antitrust, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 205, 205–06 (Roger D. Blair
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). Firms’ leadership nonetheless consists of individual
people, and recent research has identified many cognitive biases and heuristics at
work in their behavior, including a tendency to simply do what has worked in the past
in the face of a difficult decision, id. at 223, and to “punish” other firms they perceive
as behaving unfairly, id. at 212–13.
196. See generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 152, at 258, 268.
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Consider the VCR wars. Hollywood preferred a device without a
recording function.197 This made sense from their perspective because
their profits in the home-video market came from selling pre-recorded
tapes.198 Recording was at best neutral for them, since it was not feasi-
ble with extant technology to charge consumers for the privilege of
recording.199 To the extent it threatened their distribution model, as
they alleged in Sony,200 the recording feature was a negative. The new
freedoms afforded by the recording function were irrelevant to
Hollywood’s economic calculus because the benefits accrued to the
public without any additional reward to the copyright holder.201 The
copyright industries’ inability to internalize these benefits—and their
desire to utilize systems that would capture more of these benefits—
has restricted the range of innovations they are likely to pursue.
3. Preference Shaping
Third, the copyright industries may resist technologies that give
consumers more freedom over programming decisions because they
would rather retain a greater role in shaping consumers’ tastes and
preferences.202 This observation is the mirror image of the discussion
of autonomy above.203 While this may sound sinister, the motive is not
(necessarily) social control so much as it is profit: intermediaries can
make more money when they drive consumers toward their sponsors
or other affiliates. But copyright exists to promote access to and crea-
tion of works, as well as greater engagement with works, not to pro-
tect distributors and certainly not to give specific distributors the
power to control public discourse. Third-party innovators are often in
a better position than the copyright industries to introduce new com-
munications technologies because they are not beholden to the same
interest in maintaining control.
* * *
Industry incumbents have many incentives to resist entering new
access markets. It would be bad copyright policy—and bad innovation
policy—to allow them to leverage copyright ownership into monopo-
listic control over these markets.
Fortunately, the courts have already identified a strategy for cor-
recting the copyright industries’ incentives. The decisions detailed in
197. LARDNER, supra note 68, at 33–35; PATRY, supra note 70, at 150–51.
198. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 148.
199. See infra Section IV.A (describing this as a market failure due to prohibitive
transaction costs).
200. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 483 (1984).
201. See supra Section III.B.2 (describing these benefits); Frischmann & Lemley,
supra note 152, at 279 & n.80 (analyzing copyright owners’ incentives).
202. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 28–31 (explaining how these concerns are
traditional justifications for the regulation of the mass media).
203. See supra Section III.B.2.
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Part II effectively implement a use-it or lose-it requirement for con-
trol of their works in new access markets, with an exception for cases
of demonstrable substitutionary harm.204 The implicit goal of this re-
gime is not to deprive copyright owners of control, but instead to
channel them toward entering the markets. The next Part describes
how courts could expressly adopt this approach as a matter of
doctrine.
IV. FAIR USE IN ACCESS MARKETS
The foregoing policy analysis delves into factually dense and norma-
tively contestable subject matter. The expansion of access markets of-
fers a range of benefits to the public and even copyright holders
themselves, yet several factors compel the copyright industries to re-
sist them. Ideally, Congress or the Copyright Office would exercise
their fact-finding capabilities to probe these issues and then update
copyright law to secure the public benefits of these markets while also
advancing creators’ interests. In the meantime, however, courts must
also play a role in shaping copyright policy. This is especially so with
fair use, as a defense originally devised by the courts and ultimately
codified in a manner that preserves the courts’ discretion.
Courts can exercise this discretion through fair use. The fair-use de-
fense requires the court to balance four factors; the fourth and argua-
bly most important is the impact of the use on the plaintiff’s
market.205 Defendants whose use poses no threat to the copyright
owner’s profits would seem to have a valid argument that their use
was fair by reference to this factor. To develop this point fully, it is
necessary to explain how the copyright industries’ refusal to enter
these markets constitutes a form of market failure.
A. Market Refusal as Market Failure
The primary economic justification for fair use is the correction of
market failure: the systemic failure of private parties to coordinate
with one another.206 Ordinarily, the legal system trusts the market to
204. See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1389 (dubbing it a “license it or lose it”
regime).
205. The four factors include (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the na-
ture of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the
work used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
work. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
206. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1615 (“[O]ne of the necessary preconditions for
premising fair use on economic grounds is that market failure must be present.”);
Lunney, supra note 73, at 987 (“[B]ecause private markets are presumptively effi- R
cient, government intervention is justified only in cases of market failure.”). While the
“market failure” test is sometimes treated as though it were separate from the statu-
tory four-factor test for fair use, it belongs conceptually with the factor-four analysis
of “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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allocate resources such as copyrighted works to their highest-value
uses—if the use actually generates more value than the status quo,
then the user should be able to pay the copyright owner for the use.207
Judicial intervention becomes necessary only where a market failure
prevents such uses from taking place.208
This Article identifies a form of market failure that has not previ-
ously been identified: market refusal. Market refusal presents an ob-
stacle to coordination when the plaintiff attempts to reject and enjoin
a market without evidence of harm to its bottom line. This problem is
distinct from the classic “transaction-costs” market failure that pre-
dominates fair-use scholarship.209 Transaction-costs market failures
arise where payment is simply not feasible with current technology;
market-refusal scenarios are those where the copyright owner refuses
to participate in the market independent of whether payment would
be feasible. Sony provides an example of both.210 It is the paradig-
matic example of transaction-costs market failure—even if Hollywood
wished to charge users for the privilege of recording their programs on
the Betamax VCR, there was no cost-effective way to track and bill
for this particular use of their copyrighted works.211 Market refusal
was also present. Even if such billing had been feasible, it seems that
Hollywood would have resisted the Betamax because it wished to pro-
mote a competing video player that could not record from the televi-
sion and wished to maintain greater control over the scheduling of
programs.212 Its refusal in this case stood in the way of an economi-
cally and socially productive use. It was also counterproductive, given
that the film industry itself profited from the market for home
video.213
Fortnightly provides another helpful illustration because it involves
market refusal in the absence of prohibitive transaction costs.214 In the
years leading up to the Fortnightly decision, there were three major
broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) and 800 local
207. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1612–13; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD R
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (2003).
208. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1614–15 (“Fair use is one label courts use when they
approve a user’s departure from the market.”).
209. See id. at 1618; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law
of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 150–51 (2002–2003) (emphasizing that transaction costs are only
one source of market failure).
210. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
supra notes 65–83 and accompanying text.
211. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1655 (“[T]he economic cost to the copyright
owners of identifying potential violators and bringing them to justice might be greater
than any profits likely to be generated by deterrence of unauthorized taping.”).
212. LARDNER, supra note 68, at 28, 33–34, 36; PATRY, supra note 70, at 150–51; see
supra Section III.C.3.
213. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 148.
214. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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cable providers.215 While the cable providers were numerous, the net-
works were few enough in number that negotiations would have been
feasible; the networks could have simplified the process further by of-
fering a standard rate or by coming together, like the music industry
had for radio, to offer a blanket license covering all their program-
ming.216 Yet the networks did not pursue a licensing strategy in ear-
nest until after they lost in court. The networks had engaged in market
refusal even though licensing was feasible and would have been profit-
able; the compulsory license subsequently brokered through Congress
enriched the networks through both licensing fees and the expansion
of their audience.217
Of course, not all refusals to enter a new access market are market
failures.218 Wendy Gordon’s classic statement of market failure in cop-
yright requires the use to be one that serves the public interest and
one that does not substantially impair the copyright owner’s own crea-
tion incentives.219 Accordingly, the market refusal scenarios that qual-
ify as market failures are those that advance copyright’s normative
goals as described in Part III while also leaving the copyright owner
unharmed or providing an opportunity for profit through participation
in the market. Identifying these scenarios requires confronting the dis-
tinct issues posed in new playback markets and new distribution mar-
kets, respectively.
1. Playback Markets
Playback markets raise distinct issues in terms of both potential
market harms and public benefits. Playback markets, as distinguished
from distribution markets, arise around devices or services that allow
customers to view, listen to, or otherwise engage with copyrighted
works. In a true playback market, these devices or services do not
come bundled with copies of the works, and users must obtain their
own copies or broadcasts through a separate distribution market. In
practice, the dividing line between playback markets and distribution
markets is blurred because many playback devices and services also
facilitate distribution to some degree.
Market refusal is often unwarranted in playback markets because
the devices or services in question actually benefit copyright owners
rather than threaten them.220 This occurs when the new uses comple-
ment existing, authorized markets. For example, the MP3 player in-
215. See CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES, supra note 177, at 12.
216. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text.
218. Additionally, this Article is concerned only with licensing decisions involving
markets for access to already-existing works. The issues are distinct from those that
arise from licensing decisions involving the use of an existing work as an input to the
creation of a new one. See supra note 158.
219. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1601.
220. See supra notes 48, 64, 80–83, 102–104 and accompanying text.
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creased the number of songs a user could carry relative to a portable
CD player, giving consumers reason to purchase more CDs.221
The growth of a playback market may also provide copyright own-
ers a lucrative opportunity to sell copies to consumers in a compatible
format. Consumers initially flocked to the VCR due to the appeal of
taping television programs, but the film industry profited handsomely
once they began selling pre-recorded tapes to the millions of house-
holds who owned these devices.222 Similarly, the early music industry
profited once they began collecting royalties on the sale of recorded
music for pianolas and other playback devices.223 Copyright owners
can profit in these playback markets so long as they exercise the right
to sell copies in these markets; they do not need to control the devices
or services that make the market possible.
Copyright owners may nonetheless have sound arguments to enjoin
these markets in two scenarios. First are the scenarios where the copy-
right owner can demonstrate harm. A true playback market requires
users to obtain copies elsewhere, such as through the copyright own-
ers’ authorized distribution channels. These pure forms seldom exist,
however, because many playback technologies have the potential to
facilitate unauthorized distribution as well. This was true even for the
VCR, where copyright owners complained about unauthorized tap-
ing.224 The ultimate question is whether the harms of potential piracy
are great enough to outweigh the gains through legitimate sales.225
My.MP3.com illustrates a service where the harm exceeded this
threshold.226 While its proprietors advertised the service as a way to
upload one’s CDs for ease of listening from any internet-connected
computer, the system could be abused to provide access to those who
had not paid.227 Through the DMCA, Congress had already endorsed
the industry’s position that digital distribution would harm sales in the
absence of effective copy-protection measures, which My.MP3.com
lacked.228 It was straightforward for the court to find infringement in
light of this recognized harm.
Second, the playback market may not be justified if it does not
meaningfully enhance users’ capabilities. Market failure requires that
221. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
224. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420
(1984).
225. See Fromer, supra note 151, at 632 (arguing that what matters for fair use is the
net effect, not the harm measured in isolation); Tang, supra note 28, at 8 (discounting
any self-inflicted loss for failure to enter a market).
226. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
227. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, at § 13.05(G) n.697; see UMG Record-
ings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
228. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see supra notes 129–130 and accom-
panying text.
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the copyright owner’s refusal actually deprive the public of a substan-
tial benefit relative to the status quo.229 The range of autonomy-en-
hancing capabilities is vast and spans a range of time-, space-, or
device-shifting features as well as more specific innovations, such as e-
readers that allow full-text search, annotation, or text-to-speech func-
tionalities.230 If the new market merely duplicates capabilities that
users already possess, however, its value from the perspective of copy-
right policy is limited.
The Supreme Court’s most recent copyright market refusal decision
underscores this point. The defendant in Aereo utilized a warehouse
filled with thousands of dime-sized antennas to offer a streaming ser-
vice.231 Subscribers could virtually “tune in” to one of these antennas
to relay local television signals from the airwaves to the computer,
tablet, or phone of their choice.232 The programming was already
available to users free and over the air; Aereo’s service spared the
user from having to acquire home antennas to tune in and allowed for
“device-shifting” by those who would prefer not to be tethered to the
television.233
While the networks had not provided the specific convenience of
relaying broadcast television signals to one’s computer or handheld
device, they had arguably provided these capabilities in a different
way. What was valuable about Aereo was its capacity to enhance the
autonomy of those who wished to view the network’s programs via a
computer or handheld device and its inclusion of those who have
made the decision to “cut the cord.”234 Rather than creating a convo-
229. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1601 (limiting fair use to cases where correcting the
market failure serves the public interest).
230. See supra Section III.B.2 (explaining the value of this sort of autonomy for the
advancement of copyright’s normative goals).
231. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 431 (2014).
232. The defendant provided separate antennas for each subscriber because it be-
lieved (correctly) that utilizing a single antenna for each channel and then relaying the
signal for multiple subscribers would have made it liable for retransmission. Id. at
436–48, 445; see Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d
Cir. 2008). This in itself did not bode well for the defendant given the Court’s history
in penalizing those, like Aimster or Grokster, that attempted to exploit legal loop-
holes. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003); MGM
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). See supra notes 106–119 and accompa-
nying text.
233. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 431, 436–48, 445.
234. See Brief of Competition Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 16–17, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (No. 13-46)
(describing how “cord-cutters” and “cord-nevers” had been excluded). These obsta-
cles are in addition to those that users faced in the transition from analog to digital
broadcast signals, which required users to trade in their traditional “rabbit ears” an-
tennas for digital versions. See Marguerite Reardon, DTV Converter Boxes Aplenty,
but Good Luck Finding an Antenna, CNET (June 12, 2009, 6:25 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/news/dtv-converter-boxes-aplenty-but-good-luck-finding-an-antenna/
[https://perma.cc/A7W7-WEPX] (observing that even the preliminary step of “figur-
ing out exactly which antenna to use can be a big challenge”).
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luted system for intercepting broadcast signals, the networks provided
similar capabilities through direct streaming on their own apps and
websites as well as joint efforts like Hulu.235 One could thus argue that
Aereo was not justified in entering the market because it did not
meaningfully increase access to network television relative to the sta-
tus quo.236
2. Distribution Markets
Copyright owners have an easier time arguing that they should have
the right to control distribution markets. The economics are simple: if
a consumer obtains access to a copyrighted work from a new, unau-
thorized market, that consumer is unlikely to pay the copyright holder
for access in the pre-existing authorized market. Market refusal none-
theless gives rise to market failure when the third-party serves an in-
dependent consumer base or the profits available in the new market
could make up for any substitutionary harms.
Fortnightly exemplifies the independent audience scenario.237
Broadcasters had not expanded their coverage into Clarksburg or
Fairmont, West Virginia, or for that matter hundreds of other commu-
nities in the United States.238 Community access cable television ser-
vices used specialized antennas to intercept distant signals and
retransmit them to viewers in these neglected communities.239 It is dif-
ficult to see how the networks were harmed in the absence of any plan
to extend their reach into these areas. Meanwhile, the public benefits
of greater inclusiveness and diversity of programming are clear,240 and
even the networks stood to benefit to the extent that an increase in
viewership translated into greater advertising revenues.241
235. See, e.g., Brad Stone & Bryan Stetler, ABC to Add Its Shows to Videos on
Hulu, N.Y. TIMES (April 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/business/me-
dia/01hulu.html [https://perma.cc/HR2M-YGMZ] (reporting that three out of the big
four broadcast networks offered content on Hulu, specifically ABC, Fox, and NBC);
Tim Moynihan, How to Stream TV Shows Now that Aereo’s Dead, WIRED (June 27,
2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/aereo-alternatives-streaming/ [https://
perma.cc/W2PC-5JM3] (describing non-cable streaming options for ABC, NBC, CBS,
Fox, and Comedy Central).
236. As a counterpoint, sports and news programs are sometimes difficult to stream
despite their availability on broadcast television, so if Aereo expanded access to these
programs it may have served an unmet need. Aereo did not focus on this point, how-
ever, and it would still have faced liability for going beyond serving this need. Cf.
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 149, 154–55, 157 (proposing copyright liability for
device manufacturers where a reasonable alternative design could curtail
infringement).
237. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see
also supra notes 49–64 (discussing the case).
238. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES, supra note
177, at 12.
239. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390.
240. See supra Sections III.B.1 & III.B.3 (explaining how diversity and inclusion
advance the goals of copyright).
241. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
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There are limits to this example because truly independent audi-
ences are rare. Consumers are especially difficult to isolate from one
another in the present era of globalization. Copyright owners who sell
cheaper textbooks in developing countries, for example, have com-
plained of domestic losses because they cannot, as a practical or legal
matter, block the import of these books into wealthier markets like
the United States.242 The difficulty is even greater for digital copies,
which can be transmitted almost instantaneously around the globe.
Consider video streaming. A third-party might provide access to a tel-
evision program in a foreign country that the U.S. copyright owner
has declined to serve.243 Even though this would be valuable for for-
eign viewers, the copyright owner’s existing market would be harmed
if members of the domestic audience could obtain the show from that
foreign website rather than through authorized channels.244 This sub-
stitutionary harm would be enough to show that the new distribution
market was not truly independent.
The presence of substitutionary harm is not fatal, however, to the
market failure claim so long as the copyright owner’s potential (or
actual) profits in the new market are greater than its losses.245 White-
Smith provides an early example.246 History suggests that the plaintiff
composers correctly predicted that the sale of pre-recorded music
would ultimately drive down the per-capita sales of sheet music;
hardly anyone who buys a popular music album today, or any time in
the past several decades, purchases the sheet music to accompany it.
Yet market failure was still present in the composers’ refusal because
the royalties to be had in selling pre-recorded music were significantly
greater than what they made selling sheet music alone.
Teleprompter demonstrates the same point.247 For the sake of argu-
ment, let us assume the networks were correct in arguing they stood to
lose advertising revenues when cable providers carried competing sta-
tions from hundreds of miles away.248 Their complaints about lack of
compensation would be legitimate, but it would still be market failure
for them to refuse to participate in the cable-television market. Re-
242. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525–27, 553 (2013)
(finding this practice lawful under U.S. copyright law).
243. As a point of reference, consider the recent decision in Spanski Enterprises,
Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., 883 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2018), in which a Polish com-
pany infringed by supplying copyrighted television programming to U.S. consumers.
Spanski presented an especially strong case for infringement because the copyright
owner had in fact entered the market in both countries.
244. The proprietors of video streaming services attempt to keep these markets
separate through the practice of “geoblocking,” or restricting the availability of con-
tent based on location. See id. at 907.
245. See Fromer, supra note 151, at 632; Lev-Aretz, supra note 28, at 1416; Tang,
supra note 28, at 8.
246. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
247. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
248. See id. at 411–12.
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transmission fees and increased overall viewership made the networks
far more profitable than they had been before.249 As in White-Smith,
the new market benefitted the public while also generating sufficient
revenues for both the copyright owners and the new distributors to
profit. The core problem was that the parties had not devised a satis-
factory arrangement to split the newfound economic gains.
The optimal outcome in these scenarios is not one where the defen-
dant reaps all the benefits of the new market and the plaintiff gets
nothing. It would be better if the parties devised a licensing regime to
share in the profits. As discussed above, however, the copyright indus-
tries are often resistant to new access markets.250 The threat that a
court will find fair use in the event of market refusal helps to counter-
balance the copyright industries’ resistance and pushes the parties to-
ward working out an appropriate arrangement.
B. Fair Use as Incentive
Fair use is an appropriate response to market refusal not only be-
cause it is within the scope of the courts’ power, but also because it
counterbalances copyright owners’ conservatism, produces important
information on market effects, and allocates error costs to parties that
may be better equipped to bear them.
Some scholars have argued against fair use in markets like these.251
The commercial success of any market where consumers enjoy crea-
tive works is due in large part to those who created the works. Be-
cause it is a complete defense to infringement,252 a finding of fair use
denies the copyright owner any compensation and effectively disre-
gards its contributions. Critics have also expressed concerns that the
all-or-nothing nature of the defense distorts courts’ decisions.253 As an
alternative, commentators have argued in favor of compulsory li-
censes or other state-imposed strategies for splitting the gains.254
These strategies are poorly tailored to market refusal cases. If these
were cases where high transaction costs made it infeasible for the par-
ties to coordinate, compulsory licensing might make sense. It could
249. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Section III.C.
251. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1386–87; see also Alex Kozinski & Chris-
topher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513,
525–27 (1999) (arguing for compulsory licenses even in “traditional” fair-use cases
where one author builds on the work of another).
252. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringe-
ment of copyright.”).
253. See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1385.
254. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 1391; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 41,
144–45 (2004); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15 (2003) (advancing a similar proposal); Kozinski & New-
man, supra note 251, at 526–67 (proposing compulsory licenses in lieu of fair use for
derivative works).
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approximate the deal the parties would have struck if bargaining were
possible. But market refusal is a different sort of market failure, one
where the copyright owner declines to participate in a market even in
the absence of transaction-cost barriers. These refusals are at odds
with copyright’s access policy, and they occur even in situations where
the copyright owner itself could reap greater profits by entering the
new market rather than fighting to maintain the status quo.
Fair use plays a productive role against this backdrop: awarding fair
use in the face of market refusal effectively imposes a zero-royalty
license on a plaintiff who sues without first attempting to actually ne-
gotiate a license or substantiate the claim that the market harms its
interests.255 The goal with structuring the rule this way is not to penal-
ize the copyright owner. Copyright owners often deserve compensa-
tion and a degree of control over their works. Rather, the goal is to
counter the copyright industries’ conservatism in the face of new tech-
nologies where that conservatism is unwarranted. To truly make an
impact, however, courts would need to expressly announce this rule so
copyright owners could respond to the incentives it creates.
This approach would also produce better information to guide the
courts’ fair-use determinations. The plaintiff is likely to be better in-
formed than the defendant regarding the impact of a particular mar-
ket on its financial interests; requiring it to substantiate any claims of
harm compels it to share that information. Requiring the plaintiff to
provide evidence of any harms also creates a window for market test-
ing. If copyright owners could prevail without making any substantial
showing of market harm, they would be able to enjoin new markets in
their infancy. These markets might ultimately be complementary to
the copyright owners’ existing markets or their alleged harms might
be overstated, but we would never find out. By denying relief until the
plaintiff can show that it is harmed, the courts would provide a win-
dow for the facts to emerge.
One potential objection to this approach is that the delay imposes
costs on copyright owners in those cases where the new market ulti-
255. Another way to describe how fair use structures incentives in this context is
that it operates as a “penalty default” rule. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87, 91–94 (1989). Penalty default rules compel a party to engage in a particular
form of conduct by imposing an undesirable outcome if it refuses to do so. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1962 n.305 (2002) (describing an EU interoperability require-
ment as a penalty default that reduces the copyright owner’s protection against re-
verse engineering for failure to comply); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable
Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
147, 159–60 (2005) (describing the inequitable conduct defense as a penalty default
for “playing strategic games” with the USPTO). As explained in the text, another
advantage of the proposed approach is that it compels parties to share information;
this is another recognized benefit of penalty default rules. See generally Ayres & Gert-
ner, supra note 255.
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mately proves harmful. The longer the infringement continues, the
greater the damages are likely to be. The delay may also give the tech-
nology the chance to become popular among consumers, leaving the
courts and Congress hesitant to alienate the public by enjoining it.256
Copyright owners would accordingly bear the costs of the courts’ er-
ror whenever the courts failed to recognize market harm in a timely
fashion.
This objection is not fatal, however, because the copyright indus-
tries have historically been well-positioned to correct such errors. In-
cumbents in the copyright industries have repeatedly turned to
Congress for relief after adverse decisions in the courts.257 After the
courts denied them royalties in extremely lucrative markets like those
for sound recordings and cable television, they obtained licensing rev-
enues through legislation.258 They could seek similar relief in future
cases if the courts struck the wrong balance. Technology pioneers, by
contrast, have generally lacked the same sort of financial clout or leg-
islative backing. This dynamic has become more complicated, how-
ever, as technology companies have grown increasingly prominent:
Sony had the backing of the consumer-electronics industry in its day,
and there is no disputing that tech-giants like Google and Amazon
have the resources to engage in extensive litigation and lobbying. A
different approach may be more appropriate for the scrappy tech
start-up than a tech powerhouse.
All that being said, the need for such incentives can be avoided so
long as the copyright industries have actually entered the market.
Once they have done so, there is no market-refusal basis for refusing
to enforce copyright. This is not to say that the copyright owner’s will-
ingness to license should be the sole criterion in determining whether
to allow fair use; far from it. Prior scholars have identified the perils of
256. Cf. Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Op-
portunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921, 933 (2006) (explaining why
regulation of new technology must occur while social and economic responses to the
technology are still flexible).
257. See supra Section II.A.1 (detailing composers’ and broadcasters’ failed litiga-
tion and subsequent lobbying efforts).
258. See supra notes 43–48, 62–64 and accompanying text. Their success is no sur-
prise from the perspective of public-choice theory, a theory of collective action that
predicts concentrated interest groups will be more effective in advancing their inter-
ests through legislation than the general public. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991). Even
though the cumulative social value of deciding a policy issue in favor of the public
may be greater than the private value of deciding it in favor of the interest group, the
smaller individual stakes of each citizen and the temptation to “free ride” off the
efforts of others make it difficult for the general public to organize. See MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 128 (1965). This is especially likely when part of the value of the use in
question comes from spillovers that provide diffuse benefits to the public at large,
which is often the case with access markets. See supra Section III.C.2.
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replacing “fair use” with “fared use,”259 particularly for traditional
fair-use cases where an author builds or comments on a prior work.260
Market refusal is just one form of market failure, not a catch-all or
replacement for other approaches to fair use.
V. CONCLUSION
When copyright owners seek to shut down access markets, their ob-
jective goes beyond bad competition policy, bad communications pol-
icy, or bad innovation policy. Enjoining these markets would be bad
copyright policy. The access afforded by new playback and distribu-
tion markets is instrumental to achieving copyright’s goal of a more
democratic and participatory culture. By bringing this point to light,
this Article gives voice to a policy concern that has been latent in the
courts’ market refusal cases for over a century and provides guidance
on how the courts can effectuate this policy going forward.
259. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use:
Amending Section 107 To Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619,
621–28 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 46–47 (1997).
260. See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1389–90.
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